Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary
judgment granted to an employer in an ADA lawsuit brought by the EEOC. EEOC v.
West Meade Place LLP, No. 19-6469
(6th Cir. 2-8-21). The
employee suffered from anxiety attacks six months after being hired when new co-workers
were rude to her and she requested intermittent FMLA leave. After informing the plaintiff that she was
not eligible for FMLA leave and that any leave would be unpaid, her manager
told her that she would be terminated if she was unable to work, but that she
could not return to work without a medical release. The Court found that there were disputed facts
and credibility issues as to whether the employee’s termination two days later
was based on the manager’s perception that the plaintiff was disabled. “[T]he ADA requires only that there was a
perceived impairment, not necessarily that the employer perceived the
disability to limit a major life activity.”
According to the Court’s opinion, the Nashville employer requested
a voluntary medical history related to her ability to work from the plaintiff three
days after she started work (instead of between her conditional job offer and
start date). She reported taking
prescription drugs for anxiety. When her
new co-workers became rude to her, she reported their misconduct and called off
work or leave early because of panic attacks.
She then sought FMLA leave. The
doctor’s statement indicated that she would need it for a few days a few times
each year because of the panic attacks, but her managers reported that she
insisted that she was entitled to twelve consecutive weeks with pay. After being denied paid FMLA leave, the
plaintiff sought to return to work immediately, but was told that she would
need a medical release.
There are then three different versions of what
transpired. The plaintiff alleged that
she told her doctor that she required a medical release or she would be terminated
the next day. The medical office called
the employer and indicated that it was told the next day that she needed to be reassessed
and then released to return without any medical restrictions or emotional distress. In
particular, the manager could not understand why she could require FMLA one day
and then the next was ok to return to work.
The plaintiff was fired later that day for not being able to perform her
job duties.
According to the manager, the plaintiff had initially shown
her a note indicating that she needed to be off work for 12 weeks. After FMLA leave was denied and she was told
that she required a medical release to return to work, the plaintiff brought
such a release the next day (which then disappeared from her personnel file). When the employer called the physician to
confirm, it learned that the doctor had not released the plaintiff to return to
work and did not intend to do so. The
doctor also claimed to be operating a pain clinic. The manager completed paperwork indicating
that the plaintiff was terminated for being unable to work (so that she would
get unemployment), but claims that she told other managers about the falsification
of the medical release. Nothing about
the document falsification was relayed to the EEOC when the plaintiff filed her
Charge of Discrimination.
The termination documents indicated that the plaintiff was
unable to perform her job duties.
However, they also indicated that the plaintiff had relied on a
physician in Indiana where her sister worked (which the plaintiff disputed). The
notes indicated that the physician’s office had refused to release the
plaintiff to return to work without a reassessment. When the manager relayed this to the
plaintiff, she claimed to have called her physician’s office and obtained their
consent for her to return to work. She
asked her manager to call a particular telephone number and ask for a
particular person, who turned out to be the plaintiff’s sister. (The plaintiff apparently admitted that she
brought her sister into the discussion in order to better explain the plaintiff’s
FMLA rights.). The manager then called the physician again to re-confirm that
he would not release the plaintiff to return without a new evaluation. After that, the manager lectured the plaintiff
about falsifying medical releases. When
no release was provided, the employee was terminated.
Remarkably, despite the FMLA request and reason for her
termination, the employer argued that there was no evidence to show that it
knew or perceived the plaintiff as disabled. In particular, they point to the fact that
the plaintiff stated that she wanted to immediately return to work as soon as
she was informed that any leave of absence would be unpaid. The Court had no difficulty finding that there
was sufficient evidence to conclude that plaintiff may suffer a disability even
if it was transitory. (The employer
apparently never raised the affirmative defense that any impairment was minor
and transitory). Notably, the medical
office records reflect that the manager had specifically said that the medical
release must state: “no emotional distress can happen.” Also, it was disputed whether the plaintiff
was motivated to return by the unpaid leave or by the undisputed denial of FMLA
leave. Thus, it was factually possible
that the employer perceived her as disabled.
Although—as West Meade argues—Jarvis may not
have considered an anxiety disorder to constitute a disability, a “regarded as”
claim under the ADA requires only that
there was a perceived impairment, not necessarily that the employer perceived
the disability to limit a major life activity. . . .
Additionally, as documented, Jarvis
terminated Kean because Kean was “unable to do her job,” with no evidence that
she was inhibited from doing her job by anything but her anxiety disorder. “To
be sure . . . [the employer’s] knowledge of [Kean’s] medical issues—alone—is
insufficient to carry the day,” . . . . but this perspective supports the
EEOC’s argument not only that Jarvis was aware of Kean’s impairment, but also
that Jarvis believed it would inhibit Kean from fully performing her job
duties. This contradiction in Jarvis’s testimony creates a genuine issue of
material fact.
The EEOC argued that the evidence showed that “but for” the
employee’s admission of having an anxiety disorder and requesting an
accommodation (i.e., a medical leave of absence), the employer would not have
terminated her. The employer relied on
the evidence about the falsification of the medical release (i.e., either the
missing note or the sneaky request to speak with the plaintiff’s sister).
The Court indicated that the jury could interpret the
conflicting evidence any number of ways and, therefore, only the jury could
ultimately resolve whether the employer was motivated by the plaintiff’s
anxiety or by the unusual events surrounding the plaintiff’s attempt to obtain
a medical release in order to return to work.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.
