Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury and attorney’s fee award in a sexual harassment case where the jury agreed that the plaintiff had not been fired in retaliation for her complaints, but still awarded her $314 in back pay, awarded her $179K in compensatory damages (for emotional distress) and the trial court awarded her attorneys over $480K in fees (while rejecting the request for $800K in fees). Griffin v. Copper Cellar Corp., No. 25-5786 (6th Cir. 5/5/26). The Court found that the $314 amount was based on the defense’s own arguments and was presumptively entitled to be awarded in a hostile work environment case to make the plaintiff whole. It found her testimony of emotional distress sufficient to support the compensatory damage award. Finally, it concluded that her attorneys’ rejection of the offer of unconditional reinstatement and $25K for settlement was ultimately reasonable when it obtained seven times that much at trial.
According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was being
grossly and frequently sexually harassed by a restaurant co-worker. Her employer failed to stop the behavior and
was unsympathetic, even laughing at her. The employer offered her unconditional
reinstatement five weeks later and $25K to resolve her complaint, but it was
rejected by her attorneys. At trial (which
had been bifurcated between liability and damages), the employer apparently successfully
argued that she had not been fired as alleged and at best would be entitled to
no more than $314 in backpay, which is what the jury awarded to her.
The employer challenged the back pay award of $314 because
the jury had determined that the plaintiff had never been fired as alleged. Thus, if she voluntarily resigned, she was not
entitled to any back pay. The Court did not believe that this challenge was
timely, but agreed that timeliness had never been raised by the plaintiff or at
the trial court level. In any event, not
only did the defense fail to object to ANY award of back pay prior to the final
verdict, it actually suggested in closing arguments that $314 was the most that
the jury could award. The defense also had failed to assert prior to
the final verdict that only nominal damages would have been appropriate. The Court
ultimately determined that back pay is always a presumptively appropriate
remedy in a hostile work environment case.
Our cases establish that
“successful Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to back pay”
sufficient “to make them whole.” . . . In deciding on an award of back pay, a
jury considers “what the claimant would have received but for [the]
discrimination.” . . . . We have, moreover, recently upheld awards of back pay
on hostile-work-environment claims in cases that, like this one, lacked an
express jury finding of discriminatory or retaliatory dismissal . . . To be sure, an award of back pay typically
flows from a jury’s finding of discriminatory, retaliatory, or constructive
discharge. . . . But we have never held that such a verdict is
required as a foundation for an award of back pay. Here, the district court
determined that the evidence introduced was sufficient for the jury to find
Copper Cellar’s Title VII violations “responsible for [Griffin] leaving her
employment,” . . . and, therefore, that the award of back pay
reflected “what [Griffin] would have received but for” the hostile work
environment. . . . Such an award would
not, under our existing precedent, constitute a clear error of law, and thus
the district court did not abuse its discretion.
The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff was
only entitled to nominal damages because simply “being upset” by the co-worker’s
behavior was insufficient to justify such a large award. The Court cited to the plaintiff’s testimony
about how upset she was and her physical and mental manifestations. “All told, a jury considering and crediting [the
plaintiff’s] testimony could reasonably find that [the employer’s] hostile work
environment caused her substantially more than nominal harm.” The Court also could not find the award to be
excessive in light of the harassment and isolation she suffered. “Though we are
not convinced that only a “particularly sensitive” plaintiff would suffer harm
from the treatment [she] described, her exact degree of sensitivity is beside
the point where, as here, the record is not “devoid of any evidence of
intangible emotional loss to justify a large non-economic award.”
The plaintiff’s attorneys had requested $800K in fees, but
were awarded $480K. The employer argued
that they should not have been entitled to fees when they had rejected a
settlement offer of $25K and unconditional reinstatement within weeks. The Court found no abuse of discretion.
It is true that “a spurned
[settlement] offer might warrant a reduc[ed]” fee award, because “[f]ew, if
any, reasonable litigants would call a monetary judgment that comes in well
under the money offered to settle the case a success.” . . . The problem for [the employer] here is that
the $179,000 in damages [she] received was not “well under the money offered.”
Id. Quite to the contrary, [her] attorneys convinced a jury to award more than
seven times what [the employer] was willing to settle for. Therefore, even
ignoring that “a rejected settlement offer” is only one among the “broad
constellation of factors a trial court may consider” in awarding fees, this is
not a case in which “‘a less favorable recovery after trial’” could justify a
reduced fee award.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.
