Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Ohio Court of Appeals Denies Statutory Immunity to Sergeant at Pleadings Stage Based on Allegations of Bad Faith and Lack of Requirement to Anticipate Affirmative Defenses in Complaint

 Last week, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of statutory immunity to a Sheriff’s Sergeant on a motion for judgment on the pleadings of a claim of workplace harassment and denial of due process.  Little v. Cuyahoga Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 2026-Ohio-4485.  The Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged malice and bad faith when the Sergeant allegedly blamed the plaintiff for his own violation of policy, resulting in a suspension and denial of a promotion, meaning that the Sergeant was plausibly not entitled to statutory immunity. “[I]n reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement,  . . . that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff received positive performance reviews for eight years.  Then, in 2019, the Sergeant created a hostile work environment and “unlawful discipline” by accusing the plaintiff of causing the mis-release of an inmate by falsely accusing the plaintiff of violating policy when it was the Sergeant who violated the policy.  The plaintiff was then suspended and denied a promotion based on the Sergeant’s false information.  The Complaint alleged that the Sergeant’s “conduct was “unlawful, reckless, and [constituted] a deliberate disregard of [his] rights.”  The Sergeant answered the Complaint and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings alleging that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Sergeant had statutory immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07. The Court denied the motion and the Sergeant appealed only the denial of statutory immunity.

The Court found that the Sergeant was not entitled to subdivision immunity under O.R.C. § 2744.09, which only applied to political subdivisions.   The plaintiff argued that the exception to political subdivision immunity for employment-related claims barred immunity to the Sergeant.  However, the Ohio  Supreme Court had previously held that this statute applied only to political subdivisions and not its employees, meaning that the exception also did not apply to employees like the defendant sergeant.

Rather, the applicable statutory immunity for the Sergeant was O.R.C. § 2744.03

Generally, an employee of a political subdivision is immune from tort liability, subject to three exceptions set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). The exceptions are as follows:

(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities;

(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;

(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.

In this case, the Court found that based on the pleadings alone (at this stage of the litigation), the Complaint had sufficiently alleged that the Sergeant’s actions were malicious and in bad faith. 

The allegations were not merely unsupported legal conclusions. For example, [Plaintiff] alleges that Sgt. . . . , not he, violated policy that led to the erroneous release of an inmate and then provided false information about the release, leading to Little’s suspension and other ensuing negative consequences.

Malicious conduct is defined as conduct “‘indulging or exercising malice; harboring ill will or enmity.’”  . . .  Malice has also been defined as “the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to harm another . . . through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified.” . . . .  

Bad faith indicates a “dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.” . . . .  Wanton misconduct is “the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.”  . . . .  And reckless conduct is characterized by “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.”  . . .

 Ohio is a notice-pleading state.  . . . .  As such, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Civ.R. 8(A)(1). “Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity.”  . . .  Thus, “in reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement, as there is for certain types of cases, that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.  . . . .  

Having reviewed the complaint and construing all material allegations and all reasonable inferences in favor of [Plaintiff], we are unable to find that he could prove no set of facts that would support an exception to Sgt.[‘s] claimed immunity. That is, we find that Sgt.[‘s] immunity cannot be resolved in his favor at the pleading stage.

Therefore, this exception to general statutory immunity applied to permit the litigation to proceed to the discovery and summary judgment motion phase.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.