This morning, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld in a 46-page opinion most of the NLRB’s regulation requiring employers to post a notice of employees’ rights under the NLRB. However, the Court ruled that an employer’s failure to post the notice, by itself, could not constitute an independent unfair labor practice and, surprisingly, that an employer’s failure to post the mandatory notice could not operate to toll the six-month statute of limitations to file an unfair labor practice charge. National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, Case No. 11-629 (D.D.C. 3-2-12):
The Court holds that the NLRA granted the Board broad rulemaking authority to implement the provisions of the Act, and that the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating Subpart A of the challenged rule – the notice posting provision. But it also holds that the provision of Subpart B that deems a failure to cost to be an unfair labor practice, and the provision that tolls the statute of limitations in unfair labor practice actions against employers who have failed to post, do violate the NLRA and are invalid as a matter of law.
The Court found that the notice posting requirement was permissible under Section 156 of the NLRA, which provides in relevant part that ““The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [this subchapter], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” The Obama Administration argued that “employees cannot exercise their rights without knowledge of what those rights are, and they submit that the rule simply mandates that employers inform employees of those rights, which furthers the purposes of the Act.”
The Court found the portion of the new NLRB regulation which made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to fail to post the mandatory notice violated sections 158(a) and 160(a) of the NLRA, “in which Congress specifically defined and limited the conduct that could constitute an unfair labor practice.” While the NLRA does not attempt to enumerate every conceivable action which could constitute an unfair labor practice, the NLRA did place some limits on what the NLRB could declare as an ULP:
Section 160(a) empowers the Board “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of [title 29]) affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). This section has been interpreted as limiting the unfair labor practices that the Board may prohibit to only those enumerated under section 158. Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961) (“Where, as here, Congress has aimed its sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme.”); see 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,032 (concession by the Board that section 160(a) “specifically limits the NLRB’s powers to preventing only the unfair labor practices listed in [section 158] of the Act.”).
Failure to post the mandatory notice cannot reasonably be found to interfere with, obstruct or hamper employees’ NLRA rights as “interfere” is commonly understood.
Second, section 158(c), which prohibits the Board from construing “[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form” as an unfair lab
or practice or as evidence of an unfair labor practice “if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” also suggests that Congress had a narrow reading of the word “interfere” in mind. . . . Since Congress prohibited the Board from considering an employer’s express statement of its views to be an unfair labor
practice, it follows that it did not intend that an employer’s mere failure to supply information would be designated as one.
or practice or as evidence of an unfair labor practice “if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” also suggests that Congress had a narrow reading of the word “interfere” in mind. . . . Since Congress prohibited the Board from considering an employer’s express statement of its views to be an unfair laborImportantly, the Court found that an employer’s failure to post the mandatory notice is not irrelevant to whether there has been an unfair labor practice:
The Court points out that nothing in this decision prevents the Board from finding that a failure to post constitutes an unfair labor practice in any individual case brought before it. But the ruling does mean that the Board must make a specific finding based on the facts and circumstances in the individual case before it that the failure to post interfered with the employee’s exercise of his or her rights. The Court is not making an absolute statement that inaction can never be interference; rather this memorandum opinion simply holds that the Board cannot make a blanket advance determination that a failure to post will always constitute an unfair labor practice.
The Court also rejected the new regulation’s provision tolling the six-month statute of limitations to file an ULP Charge:
This provision not only extends the statute of limitations for unfair labor practice proceedings arising out of the failure to post, it applies to all unfair labor practice actions against employers where the notice was not posted. The Court concludes, as in the case of the unfair labor practices provision, that Congress did not leave a gap for the agency to fill with respect to the statute of limitations. Instead, in section 160(b), Congress plainly mandated a short time period during which an aggrieved person must file a charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (“[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board . . . .”). The challenged provision of the rule upends that requirement.
While the Court noticed the applicability of equitable tolling, it refused to apply legal precedent under Title VII and the ADEA to the NLRA because, unlike the NLRA, those statutes specifically contained a notice-posting requirement and, in Title VII cases, the tolling is only applied on a case-by-case basis. In contrast, the NLRB’s regulation does not apply to consideration of individual circumstances in automatically tolling the statute of limitations and does not put the burden of proving equitable tolling on the plaintiff/government.
Finally, the Court rejected the First Amendment argument in that the employer was not being forced to state anything by posting a government-embossed poster.
As previously reported herre, the NLRB’s requirement that employers post the notice of NLRA rights becomes effective on April 30, 2012.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
