Ohio’s Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Cases Continue Yo-Yo Paths in Appellate Courts

Yesterday, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals volleyed the Alexander case, which is likely to return to the Ohio Supreme Court concerning a public policy wrongful discharge claim involving the discharge of a private police officer who alleged that he was fired for enforcing Ohio’s traffic laws. Alexander v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation , 2012-Ohio-1737. As previously discussed here, the plaintiff was fired for slapping a car hard enough to dislodge the side-view mirror after the driver disregarded his instruction to stop at a cross-walk. He had previously been disciplined for yelling at a bus driver that drove so close to him that it knocked him down. Therefore, the employer concluded that he lacked sufficient customer service skills. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that he was fired for performing his law enforcement duties. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed summary judgment, which the employer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. That Court, in turn, vacated the decision in light of its decision in Dohme requiring the identification of a specific statute, case or regulation reflecting public policy. (As you may recall, Dohme travelled back and forth between the Montgomery Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court on whether there was a final appealable order and then on the merits). Yesterday, the Court of Appeals identified what it found to be a sufficiently specific statute that reflected the public policy jeopardized by the plaintiff’s termination and again reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for the employer.

Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiff:

cites to R.C. 1702.80(D), R.C. 2935.03, and common law, “where cases have made it clear, that as a matter of public policy police officers may not be fired for enforcing the law.” The cases Alexander cites to in support of his common law argument are Barnes v. Cadiz, 7th Dist. No. 01531CA, 2002-Ohio-1534, ¶15 and State v. Boymin, 106 Ohio App. 393, 154 N.E.2d 823 (9th Dist.1958). . . . . The statute governs qualified nonprofit corporation police departments such as the CCPD and provides that if a qualified nonprofit corporation establishes a police department, the department “shall preserve the peace, protect persons and property, enforce the laws of the state” and “each police officer * * * is vested with the same powers and authority as are vested in a police officer of a municipal corporation.” R.C. 1702.80(D).

The employer argued that this statute could not constitute a valid public policy or satisfy the clarity element of a wrongful discharge claim because it did not apply to the employment relationship, like, for instance, OSHA. However, the Court disagreed:

We find, however, no requirement that a supporting statute be employment-related or otherwise set forth an employer’s responsibilities and/or an employee’s rights. For illustration purposes, in Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 72, 652 N.E.2d 653, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Ohio’s criminal sex offense statutes embodied sufficiently clear expressions of public policy to justify a public policy exception in cases of sexual harassment and discrimination.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.