With respect
to the unfair competition claim, the trial court had borrowed the standard from
the law of malicious prosecution and instructed the jury that they could find
for the defendant company if the plaintiff’s lawsuit was not brought in good
faith, but was brought with the intention of injuring the defendant. The Supreme Court held that this standard
was too low (in light of a citizen’s First Amendment right to petition
government for redress) and instead, adopted the following standard:
To successfully
establish an unfair competition claim based upon legal action, a party must
show that the legal action is objectively baseless and that the opposing party had the subjective intent to
injure the party’s ability to be competitive.
Several of the dissenting/concurring justices would have
remanded the case for another trial under the new standard. (After all, the
plaintiff had survived a directed verdict motion, which indicates that the
trial court found some objective basis to exist). However, the majority concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to introduce any evidence to support its claims and,
therefore, a new trial – more than 10 years after the facts at issue – was unnecessary
and burdensome. In short, the Court found the plaintiff
company’s concerns that the defendant employees had misappropriated a software
program had not been proven when the defendants’ competing program was written
in a different language and, according to expert opinions, did not share any
code. That the competing software
accomplished the same objective was not actionable. (The Court’s discussion of the plaintiff
company’s evidentiary objections was interesting in that the plaintiff company
objected to the introduction of evidence that may have actually supported its
decision to bring the lawsuit).
The defamation claim was based on a memorandum written to
the plaintiff’s employees about the lawsuit and directing them not to comment
on it. The jury found that the
plaintiff had abused its qualified privilege by indicating that the defendant
employees had misappropriated intellectual property. The Court found that, in context, the memorandum
was nothing than the typical directive for employees to not comment on a
lawsuit (which, coincidentally, the NLRB has indicated would be inappropriate). The syllabus holding on this is stated as
follows:
In determining whether a statement is defamatory as a matter of law, a court must review the totality of the circumstances and read the statement in the context of the entire publication to determine whether a reasonable reader would interpret it as defamatory.The second allegedly defamation statement was contained in a news article about the litigation and quoted the plaintiff’s attorney discussing the claims made. Again, the jury found the attorney to be speaking as an agent of the plaintiff and that the statements exceeded the applicable qualified privilege. Nonetheless, the Court again found the statements were appropriate in context. More importantly, the Court found that the plaintiff client could not be held vicariously liable for statements made by its attorney unless it authorized or ratified them.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you
of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not
apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.