Monday, March 25, 2013

Sixth Circuit Reverses Termination of LTD Benefits as Arbitrary and Capricious and Retroactively Awards Benefits

Last week, the Sixth Circuit surprisingly reversed as arbitrary and capricious under ERISA the decision of an insurance company to terminate LTD benefits it had previously awarded to the plaintiff.  Neaton v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. 11-6-61 (6th Cir. 3-21-12).  In that case, the plaintiff suffered from a rare genetic condition that made him particularly susceptible to skin cancer, requiring him to submit with increasing frequency to increasingly invasive surgeries to remove and repair carcinomas before they spread to other organs.  His medical condition was only expected to worsen as he aged and was exposed to sunlight and fluorescent lighting and his recovery time kept him off work fairly regularly. Prior to applying for long-term disability, the plaintiff held a well-compensated position as a debt collector.  After much consideration, the defendant granted his application, but then determined approximately six months later that the plaintiff was well enough to perform his – or a substantially similar job – from home.  The Court found this decision to be arbitrary and capricious for a number  of reasons, including the lack of improvement in the plaintiff’s underlying medical condition, the defendant’s failure to seek or consider the treating physician’s opinion on the plaintiff’s ability to recover more quickly from his surgeries if he was working from home, the defendant’s failure to consider all types of the plaintiff’s recent surgeries in underestimating his anticipated absenteeism, and the defendant’s unsupported conclusion that the plaintiff’s employer would accommodate the anticipated number of medical absences plaintiff was expected to incur in the future.  Although the trial court had granted the insurance company judgment on the pleadings, the Sixth Circuit reversed and retroactively reinstated the LTD benefits.

The Court found that the plan administrator was vested with discretionary authority to administer the plan because employees were required to submit satisfactory proof of disability in order to receive benefits.  There was also a question about a potential conflict of interest when the same entity both administers the benefit plan and pays the claim.

The plaintiff argued that it is always suspicious when a claimant is later found to no longer be disabled without any change or improvement in his underlying medical condition.   In this case, “based on a review of [the plaintiff’s] file, a [defendant] employee concluded that he was no longer eligible for disability benefits because he was able to perform his former job, a sedentary, indoor occupation.”  When his benefits were terminated the next day, the plaintiff protested on the grounds that his conditioned had only worsened since his application and he would appeal.  The defendant hired two other physicians to review his claim.

 As an initial matter, the defendant’s consulting physicians greatly minimized the amount of recovery time the plaintiff would require from his surgeries and assumed that his recovery time would be shortened if he were permitted to work from home.  His treating physician was never consulted about whether there would be a reduction in his recovery time if he worked from home and the plaintiff insisted the recovery time was significant.  It was an error to give preference to non-treating physicians on the issue of recovery time – particularly without consulting the treating physician at all – “because a patient’s recovery time following surgery is variable and depends in part on the extent of a patient’s pain. Accordingly, the length of the patient’s recovery is in large part a credibility determination.” 

While it is not per se improper to rely on the opinion of a non-examining medical consultant, whether a doctor has physically examined the claimant is a factor that may be considered in determining whether a plan administrator acted arbitrarily in giving greater weight to the opinion of its consulting physician. Kalish, 419 F.3d at 508. The plan administrator’s failure to require a physical examination “may, in some cases, raise questions about the thoroughness and accuracy of the benefits determination.” Calvert v. Firstar Fin. Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005). Indeed, the lack of a physical examination may be particularly inadequate where, as here, the file reviewer makes critical credibility determinations.

This Circuit has repeatedly criticized the rejection of the opinion of a treating physician that is consistent with the medical record, in favor of non-examining file reviewers.

While it is not an abuse of discretion to give more weight to a consulting physician opinion than that of a treating physician, in this case, the defendant’s physicians failed to consult the treating physician about this issue at all.

Although the district court did not wholly disregard the opinion of [the plaintiff’s] treating physician, a court should not uphold a termination when there is an absence of reasoning in the record to support it. McDonald, 347 F.3d at 172. The number of days [the plaintiff] required to recover from a[n invasive] Moh’s procedure if working from home is in large part a credibility determination. See Calvert, 409 F.3d at 297. [Defendant’s] exclusive reliance on the opinion of a physician who never physically examined [the plaintiff], or even spoke to him about his recovery process, calls into question the quantity and quality of the medical evidence and opinion.

Secondly, the Court also found that the defendant’s expert underestimated the plaintiff’s absenteeism by not including his absences for the less-invasive carcinoma removal procedures and considering the period of time before his medical condition worsened following the application for LTD benefits.

The vocational expert’s opinion here, based upon calculating the average frequency of [the plaintiff’s] surgeries over a timeline beginning prior to the time he claimed to be disabled, results in an artificially low assumption as to the frequency of his surgeries and work absences, and does not constitute substantial evidence to support [Defendant’s] denial of benefits. Moreover, regardless of which time period the Court considers, any one of the periods shows a number of absences greater than what government statistics suggest could be accommodated.

Finally, the defendant’s vocational expert also concluded – without citation to any authority whatsoever – that the plaintiff’s anticipated level of absenteeism – which the Court already found was artificially low – could be accommodated by “the common practice of employers.”  “Conclusory medical and vocational opinions that fail to provide evidence or reasoning to support the conclusions are insufficient to support a denial of benefits.”  There was no evidence in the file that the plaintiff’s employer would accommodate the anticipated level of absenteeism, or that it would he qualify for paid sick leave for all of the anticipated days.  The Court then referred to evidence that he was anticipated to miss more than 20 days (and perhaps almost 30) per year, but that government studies showed that few employers paid more than 10 days per year in sick pay.  (There was no discussion about accrued paid leave benefits, presumably because they had long since been exhausted).


Finding the termination of LTD benefits to be arbitrary and capricious under the circumstances, the Court determined that the proper remedy was to reinstate the plaintiff’s LTD benefits retroactively to the date of their termination instead of remanding the matter for reconsideration by the plan administrator.   While the plan administrator may conduct another review and ultimately decide to properly terminate benefits, it cannot benefit from its prior arbitrary and capricious decision. “A retroactive award of long-term disability benefits wrongfully withheld and reinstatement of Neaton’s long-term disability payments is the appropriate remedy in this case.”
 
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.