In Crawford, the plaintiff
suffered from PTSD after being held hostage at gun-point by a co-worker while working
a second job at Safe Auto in 2005. She
was promoted by the defendant employer shortly thereafter and reported to a
supervisor in Michigan and one in Phoenix.
While she took FMLA leave, the decision was made to transfer her
position to Phoenix and she was allegedly demoted a month after her return to
work to a less important position (but at the same pay, hours and bonus
potential). In a series of prior emails among management, questions were raised
about whether a business justification existed for the change in her position. Managers were told that they could not
eliminate her position and give her severance because the team had actually
expanded. Upper management requested to
review her personnel files, and suggested making her part-time or re-deploying
her. Upper management also suggested
putting her in a new role and then treating her as having resigned (without
severance pay) if she resisted. She
filed suit instead and alleged that she was re-instated to a non-equivalent
position upon returning from FMLA leave and was retaliated against for
exercising FMLA leave.
The Court’s
majority concluded that whether her new job was an “equivalent position” to
which she was statutorily entitled upon returning from FMLA leave was a question
for the jury. While the employer
contended that it was an “equivalent position” and that the transfer did not
take place until a month after she completed her FMLA leave, the plaintiff
raised questions about whether her reporting to a former peer and a reduction
in her level of responsibility and career advancement potential made it less
desirable. “Even if
both positions carried equal pay and benefits, if the Quality Analyst II
position did not require a similar level of training and education, then it was
not equivalent in terms of status and thus the positions would not be
equivalent under the FMLA.”
The Court also found that the plaintiff raised a question
for a jury about whether the restructuring of her position was done in
retaliation for her exercising FMLA leave.
The Court noted that Supreme Court’s retaliation from Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway v.
White applied to FMLA retaliation claims: “[A] plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Here, Crawford has presented
evidence that, upon returning from FMLA leave, she was transferred to a lesser
position from Project Manager I to Quality Analyst II. Crawford argues that her
new position constituted a demotion because the position included more clerical
duties, did not require the same level of expertise, and she was required to
report to a former peer. There is evidence in the record that suggests that
Chase wanted to eliminate Crawford’s position, but there was no business reason
to justify doing so. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Crawford was transferred
to a seemingly lateral position, the change in job responsibilities support an
inference of an adverse employment action. See
Fisher v. Wellington Exempted Village Schs. Bd. of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 2d
833, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (explaining that a lateral transfer is actionable as
an adverse employment action if the conditions of the transfer would have been
objectively intolerable to a reasonable person and changes in job
responsibilities should be considered in this analysis). An email exchange
among high-level supervisors demonstrates that there was a change in Crawford’s
responsibilities in the new role and that these changes might cause Crawford to
decline the new position and resign. As such, the change in positions shortly
after Crawford’s return from FMLA leave, under these circumstances, could deter
a reasonable employee in Crawford’s position from exercising her FMLA rights.
We find that there is a genuine issue as to whether Crawford suffered an
adverse employment action when Chase transferred her to a lesser position after
she returned from FMLA leave.
Moreover, the
fact that the transfer/demotion took place only a month after her return to
work also raised a question about the
temporal proximity. “Such temporal proximity is ‘unduly suggestive’ and satisfies the
causation element of plaintiff’s prima facie case at the summary judgment
stage.”
Regardless of its prior discussion, the Court found that the
bank identified a business justification: the desire to transfer plaintiff’s
job without adding another employee.
However, it also found that the plaintiff was able to show that the bank’s
explanation might be pretextual:
Here, Crawford raises an issue of fact regarding whether
Chase’s proffered explanation was pretextual by presenting emails from
high-level supervisors in her former department. Crawford relies on emails from
Nicks, stating that Chase could not justify eliminating Crawford’s position,
but the position could be moved to the Phoenix office so long as the transfer
did not require hiring a new person. (Page ID 359.) These emails also suggest that
the transfer of Crawford’s position involved at least some ulterior motive to
push Crawford out of the company by offering her a lesser position with the
hope that she would resign. (Page ID 359-62.) Therefore, Crawford has put forth
evidence to show that Chase’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason for eliminating
her position was potentially pretextual.
The dissenting judge objected to the weight given to the
plaintiff’s view that she had been demoted instead of laterally
transferred. He found her objections to
the changes in her job were de minimis.
Moreover, the dissent found that the transfer did not constitute unlawful
interference if the Bank could show that it would have taken the action even in
the absence of the plaintiff’s FMLA leave. The dissent believed that the bank had carried
its burden of justifying the transfer and showing it was unrelated to her FMLA
leave. Similarly, the dissent found
that the Bank had likewise disproved any unlawful retaliation. Her former peer had been promoted and was
supervising several employees, not just her.
Moreover,
there was no evidence that this transfer was designed to
silence Plaintiff or scare her away from future FMLA requests. The record shows
that she was always given leave under the FMLA when she requested it. After her
most recent leave she was given raises and eventually promoted, and she was
later given permission to work from home. This also eliminates Plaintiff’s ability to show a causal connection between
her FMLA leave and any adverse consequences. There is no basis upon which this
Court can infer that her transfer had anything to do with her FMLA leave, as
she had taken leaves repeatedly before and not faced any adverse consequences.
To the extent that she can show any adverse consequences, her evidence proves
at best that Van Dam bore her some animus, but that animus seems to have been
based on personal dislike, rather than retaliation cognizable under the FMLA.
NOTICE: This summary is
designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does
not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation
because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can
change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this
information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you
have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
