Tuesday, September 9, 2014

Sixth Circuit ERISA Decisions from August

The Sixth Circuit issued three interesting ERISA decisions last month. In the first case, the Court affirmed dismissal of the LTD claim as untimely where the plan provided a limitations period of three years from when the initial proof of claim was required and the plaintiff filed suit within 8 months after the conclusion of her internal appeal following a contractual change in the eligibility standard.  In the second decision, the Court affirmed denial of LTD benefits on the basis of physical disability, but reversed on the mental disability LTD claim.  In the third case, the decision of the claims administrator (aka insurance company) on medical coverage was repeatedly reversed in three court appeals for refusing to consider and/or explain why it was not accepting the medical recommendations of the treating physicians for inpatient alcohol rehabilitation after several failed attempts at outpatient rehabilitation as provided in the insurance company’s internal guidelines. Ultimately, the court decided that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and ruled in favor of the claimant.

In Russell v. Catholic Partners Employee LTD Plan, No. 13-4804 (6th Cir. 8-14-14), the nurse claimant submitted a claim for LTD benefits based on a knee and mental impairment which prevented her on May 12, 2007 from continuing the RN job she had held for 30 years.   Her LTD benefits were granted on November 15, 2007 since she was unable to continue her regular occupation.  However, she was also informed at that time that the standard of eligibility changed after two years and she would then be required to show that she was unable to work in any gainful occupation in order to continue receiving LTD benefits.   After the two years passed, her claim for LTD was denied since the insurance carrier determined that she could perform work as a case manager or triage nurse despite her physical and mental impairments.  The claimant appealed internally and the final denial was issued on July 20, 2010.  When the claimant initiated a federal court lawsuit on March 20, 2011, the carrier moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run. 

The LTD Plan required written proof of a claim to be submitted within 90 days of the 180-day elimination period.   It also provided that a federal lawsuit could be initiated 60 days after proof of the claim had been submitted and within 3 years after the proof of claim was required.   The Court determined that the proof of claim was required to be submitted by February 8, 2008 and, therefore, the limitations period expired on February 8, 2011 – fifty days before the claimant initiated the lawsuit.   The Court rejected the claimant’s argument that the limitations period was re-set by the application of a different eligibility standard on November 12, 2009. “The Supreme Court recently held “a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.”  In this case, the claimant had six months after the final denial of her LTD claim on July 20, 2010 to file suit before the three-year limitations period expired. “The plan’s use of the “any gainful occupation” standard did not reset the contractual limitations period.”  The Court also refused to re-set the limitations period each time the carrier requested new evidence supporting proof of continuing disability. 

In Hayden v. Martin Marietta Materials Inc. Flexible Benefits Program, No. 13-6319 (6th Cir. 8-18-14), the claimant left work in January 2010 because of a variety of physical ailments and mental impairments (depression and anxiety).  She sought and was awarded SSI benefits.   However, she was denied LTD by her employer’s claims administrator on the grounds that her physical ailments were objectively insufficient to render her unable to work in her profession (as an office manager) and her mental impairments were not sufficiently severe to prevent her from working.  The Court agreed that the claimant failed to show that she was physically unable to work during the entire 180-day elimination period. For instance, her physician’s notes did not mention her arthritic hands until eleven months after she stopped working and similarly did not discover other conditions until after the elimination period. Her “minor” heart condition from 2008 similarly did not prevent her from working.   Therefore, the plan’s decision to deny benefits on this basis was not arbitrary or capricious.
The Court reversed the claims administrator, however, on the mental disability claim because the reviewer imposed a higher standard than the criteria outlined in the plan documents.  The reviewer denied benefits on the grounds that the claimant could perform some work, instead of evaluating whether she was mentally capable of continuing to perform her own profession.  Indeed, the reviewer’s decision “suggests that Hayden would have had to be suffering from “severe psychiatric symptoms, suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, hallucinations” to be considered disabled.” This decision would effectively preclude any claimant from showing that depression or anxiety as a “disability— [and] is inconsistent with the terms of the Plan, which focus on whether a claimant can perform the material and substantial duties of her own occupation.”  The reviewer also denied benefits in part because he was influenced by the fact that the claimant’s employer was going through bankruptcy.  The treating physicians and psychiatrist had explained that her anxiety was related to her own health problems and those of her husband.  

It is true, as a general matter, that when a plan administrator relies on the opinion of one doctor over that of another, “the plan administrator’s decision cannot be said to have been arbitrary and capricious because it would be possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based upon the evidence, for the plan administrator’s decision.”  . . . . But ERISA does not grant to a plan administrator carte blanche to adopt the opinions of its reviewing physicians. When a reviewing physician’s report is “inadequate,” a plan administrator cannot be said to engage in a deliberate, principled reasoning process when it adopts the position of that report.  . . .  In particular, where a reviewing physician’s opinion applies standards that conflict with the terms of the plan, that opinion is not evidence supporting a conclusion that the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the plan.

Instead of remanding the case for another review, the Court awarded benefits to the Claimant based on her mental disability in light of the uncontroverted evidence.

In Butler v. United Healthcare of Tennessee, Inc,  No. 14-6446 (6th Cir. 8-22-14), the claimant was a long-time alcoholic, who attempted a variety of outpatient treatment programs before finally admitting herself into an inpatient facility in 2005.  Her husband’s insurance company denied coverage, although she seemed to meet the insurance carrier’s internal criteria (as they belatedly discovered only after initiating the litigation), of having a “[h]istory of continued and severe substance abuse despite appropriate motivation and recent treatment in an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization program.”  Her husband paid for her inpatient treatment and pursued two internal appeals of the denial of coverage.   The external reviewer hired for the third internal appeal was given an incorrect standard by the insurance company and failed to explain why he disagreed with the recommendations of the claimant’s two treating physicians or mention the claimant’s history of failed outpatient rehabilitation.   After litigation commenced in 2008, the carrier realized it had given the wrong standard to the external reviewer and attempted to correct that mistake, but the reviewer affirmed his prior decision and still failed to explain why he disagreed with the recommendations of the claimant’s two treating physicians or mention the claimant’s history of failed outpatient rehabilitation.   

The Court agreed that the insurance carrier had not completed a complete or fair review of the case and remanded it for the carrier to explain why it disagreed with the recommendations of the claimant’s two treating physicians and why the claimant’s history of failed outpatient rehabilitation was irrelevant.  Instead, the carrier obtained another letter from the same external physician claiming that he believed he had previously reviewed the letters from the treating physicians and, in any event, after reviewing the file again he still believed coverage should be denied, but still did not explain why he disagreed with the treating physicians.  The Court remanded the case again for the insurance carrier to retain a different external reviewer, explain why it disagreed with the treating physicians and permit the submission of new medical information.  The claimant submitted new medical information that specifically addressed the carrier’s internal criteria for inpatient treatment (which was not disclosed until after litigation commenced).  While the carrier retained a new external reviewer, it suggested that the reviewer should not give much weight to the new medical information.  The reviewer, in turn, made the same mistakes as the first reviewer:  He denied coverage without explaining why he disagreed with the treating physicians or why the claimant’s unsuccessful outpatient treatment did not qualify under the carrier’s own criteria.  Accordingly, the Court granted judgment for the claimant and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  

United’s refusal to give Janie’s benefits claim a fair review not once, not twice, but three times—in spite of clear instructions from the district court—casts a pall over United’s handling of the claim from the start. Through it all, through three chances to get it right (indeed through three chances just to engage in a nonarbitrary decision-making process), United failed the Butlers in multiple ways. United never explained its disagreement with the opinions of Janie’s treating physicians, which all contained detailed accounts of her prior attempts to get sober using increasingly intensive outpatient programs and which unequivocally deemed residential treatment necessary.  . . .United ignored key pieces of evidence and the key guideline applicable to Janie’s claim, making factually incorrect assertions (e.g., Janie had no history of trying unsuccessfully to treat her addiction with outpatient treatment),  . . ., or remaining silent about the matter,  . . . or (worst of all) mentioning the prior failures but nonetheless concluding without explanation that she did not meet the guideline requirements,  . . .. And United stacked the deck against the claim, instructing reviewers to “disregard” the evidence that John submitted in favor of the “contemporaneous physician-authored documents” that it had entered in the record.
                . . .

United adds that the decision to deny benefits cannot be arbitrary and capricious because five reviewing physicians agreed with it. That reviewing physicians paid by or contracted with the insurer agree with its decision, though, does not prove that the insurer reached a reasoned decision supported by substantial evidence. The physicians’ opinions carry weight only to the extent they provide a fair opinion applying the standard for granting benefits to the facts of the case. Elliott, 473 F.3d at 619. The reviewing physicians did not do that. They misstated or omitted the key fact of Janie’s prior failed outpatient treatment and ignored United’s guideline that allowed residential rehabilitation where outpatient treatment had not worked in the past. This argument, too, proves too much. If a decision to deny benefits could never be arbitrary and capricious when backed by the insurer’s reviewing physicians, court review would be for naught. The insurer would invariably prevail so long as the insurer had physicians on its staff willing to confirm its coverage rulings. That also does not make sense.

The District Court had also penalized the carrier for failing to earlier provide a copy of its internal criteria.  However, the statute only imposes liability on the Plan Administrator (the employer), not the claims administrator (i.e., the insurance company).
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.