According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had several
surgeries for a brain tumor and returned to work. After his second surgery, he began to act
strangely (i.e., overreacting, secretly recording his boss and his wife, suing
his boss and trying to press criminal charges against his now ex-wife, etc.),
but did not threaten himself or others with physical harm. Nonetheless, following his third surgery, he
was referred for a fitness for duty, psychological examination where a
neurologist found him unfit to return to work because he “may be a threat to
himself and others.” The plaintiff
sought a second opinion from another neuropsychiatrist, who found him fit to
return to work. A third physician confirmed
the first evaluation in subsequent, but briefer, evaluation. (Similarly, a fourth evaluation which the
plaintiff secretly initiated also found him unfit for duty). However, when he applied for disability pay,
the insurance company’s evaluating physicians were sharply critical of the
prior medical opinions and denied him compensation on the grounds that he was
fit for duty and able to return to work without restrictions. Based in part on his erratic behavior, the
City refused to reinstate him and relied on the evaluations of the two
physicians which had found him a possible danger to himself and others. He
filed a lawsuit for disability discrimination under the ADA and the court
granted summary judgment for the employer.
The Court agreed that the plaintiff could not carry
his burden of proving that he was qualified to perform the essential functions
of his job because the employer had reasonable medical evidence that he posed a
direct threat.
An employer’s determination that a person cannot safely
perform his job functions is objectively reasonable when the employer relies
upon a medical opinion that is itself objectively reasonable. . . . A medical opinion may conflict with
other medical opinions and yet be objectively reasonable.
The Court found that the employer had both reasonable
medical evidence and testimonial evidence about the plaintiff’s odd behavior to
justify keeping him off work. The first
medical opinion was not a cursory report, but followed a seven-hour evaluation,
nine hours writing an eleven page report.
The second opinion relied on a 90 minute evaluation and a review of the
prior report and medical records. In
contrast, the disability insurance physicians only reviewed records and the
reports instead of independently evaluating the plaintiff.
The Court’s majority rejected the relevance of the
conflicting medical evidence:
Only one of the doctors discussed the specific job functions
of the City’s patrol officers, and none ventured specifically to say that
Michael could safely engage in high-speed driving or make snap decisions
regarding whether to use lethal force. Those omissions are conspicuous.
But there is a larger problem with Michael’s argument.
Reasonable doctors of course can disagree—as they disagree here—as to whether a
particular employee can safely perform the functions of his job. That is why
the law requires only that the employer rely on an “objectively reasonable”
opinion, rather than an opinion that is correct. . . .
Indeed, in many cases, the question whether one doctor is right that an
employee can safely perform his job functions, or another doctor is right that
the employee cannot, will be unknowable—unless the employer runs the very risk
that the law seeks to prevent. Here, the
City was not required to invite a section 1983 claim later in order to an ADA
claim now. Right or wrong, the opinions upon which the City relied were
objectively reasonable; and that means the City is not liable.
Importantly, the City also had its own reason for believing
that the plaintiff might be a direct threat based on his erratic behavior
showing poor judgment. These issues were
not addressed by the medical opinions which found him to be fit for duty.
In another opinion rendered the same week, a different
panel likewise affirmed summary judgment for an employer which had referred the
plaintiff teacher to be evaluated for fitness for duty when she was routinely
tardy, seemed to be falsifying grades, could not control the students in her
classroom (which was constantly in disarray), failed to implement a mandatory reading
program, and regularly required other employees to assist her assert control
over unruly and delinquent students. Belasco v. Warrensville
Heights City School Distr.. No. 15- 3131 (6th Cir.
12-11-15). She testified that she was
afraid that the students would knock her down because of her balance
impairment. The physicians found her
also be short of breath. When the plaintiff requested a second opinion
and selected her own physician, the first opinion was confirmed. Neither physician believed that she could
appropriately respond to emergencies. She was ultimately terminated after a
hearing. The Court found that she had failed to provide any medical support
that her belatedly requested accommodation – a walker – would enable her to
perform the essential functions of her job.
While the plaintiff questioned whether the evaluations were “reasonably calculated to measure
the essential functions of her job,” she failed
to offer any evidence that the validity of the
fitness-for-duty test depends on whether each element qualitatively and quantitatively
corresponds exactly to narrowly defined aspects of the job in question. One
might wonder, for example, how a teacher’s ability to respond in emergencies
could be tested if not by using other tasks as proxies for an emergency. Moreover,
by arguing that “many of the tasks required by the tests” were unrelated to
essential functions, Belasco implicitly concedes that at least some aspects of
the fitness-for-duty tests were related to essential functions. See R. at 17,
Appellant Br. 13–14. Belasco does not explain why her failure to pass the
relevant aspects of the fitness-for-duty tests cannot independently support the
examiners’ conclusions that she was unable to perform essential functions of
her job— namely, supervising students, ensuring their safety, and responding in
emergencies. Her critique of the exams does not rebut these critical pieces of
information.
In addition, the Court found that in light of abundance of
evidence that she was unqualified, she needed to do more than poke a few holes
in the evaluation. Instead, she was
required to prove that she was qualified for her teaching job.
Further, the Court found that she also failed to identify a
reasonable accommodation that would have enabled her to perform her job
duties. The request for a walker was not
supported by medical evidence. Her
request for a teaching aide was inappropriate because the law does not require
an employer to hire a second employee to perform the essential job functions
for another employee. In any event, the
union refused to consent to the hiring of a part-time aide, even as an
accommodation to a teacher with decades of experience. The Court distinguished the situation when
the employer replaced her with two substitute teachers because the extra
teacher was required to help the students to catch up after spending a semester
with the plaintiff’s inadequate performance and had not been hired – as plaintiff
suggested – to help control the unruly students.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you
of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not
apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can be changed or amended without
notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If
you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or
retain an employment attorney.
