According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was a police
detective and a personal friend of the political opponent of the incumbent mayor
(who had appointed the police chief and the plaintiff’s supervisor). He was observed by fellow officers holding
the opponent’s election sign and chatting with his election staff. He was demoted to beat patrol the next day
because of his “overt involvement” in the opponent’s campaign. He denied that he had been supporting his
friend’s campaign and explained that he had simply been picking up an election
sign at the request of his invalid mother.
Because he had not actually been engaged in arguably protected First
Amendment activities when he ran an errand for his mother, the trial court
granted judgment for the employer on the grounds that its mistaken assumption about
his activities could not form the basis of a claim under the First Amendment or
§1983 and he had not been denied any First Amendment or other constitutional
right. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed.
“With a few
exceptions, the Constitution prohibits a government employer from discharging
or demoting an employee because the employee supports a particular political
candidate.” For purposes of this case,
the Court assumed that the activities in which the employer mistakenly believed
that the plaintiff had engaged were, in fact, protected and that no legal
exceptions were implicated. The text of
the First Amendment is not clear whether the constitutional right should focus
on the employer’s motive or the employee’s actual conduct. Nonetheless, in a prior case, the Court had
found that an employer’s reasonable, but mistaken, belief that an employee had
engaged in unprotected petty gossip rather than protected First Amendment
conduct was sufficient to relieve the employer of liability. Therefore, if an employer could avoid liability
through a mistaken belief that the employee had not engaged in protected conduct, it could just as easily become
liable for acting on a mistaken belief that the employee had engaged in
protected conduct even though he had not.
[A] rule of law finding liability in these circumstances
tracks the language of the First Amendment more closely than would a contrary
rule. Unlike, say, the Fourth Amendment, which begins by speaking of the “right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .
,” the First Amendment begins by focusing upon the activity of the Government.
It says that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.” The Government acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy whether [the
plaintiff] did or did not in fact engage in political activity. That which
stands for a “law” of “Congress,” namely, the police department’s reason for
taking action, “abridge[s] the freedom of speech” of employees aware of the
policy. And [he] was directly harmed, namely, demoted, through application of
that policy.
“The employer’s factual mistake does not
diminish the risk of” discouraging employees from engaging in protected
activities. The Court rejected the
argument that focusing on the employer’s motive would make litigation more
expensive for employers and, instead, noted that it would become more difficult
for plaintiffs:
a rule of law that imposes liability despite the employer’s
factual mistake will not normally impose significant extra costs upon the
employer. To win, the employee must prove an improper employer motive. In a
case like this one, the employee will, if anything, find it more difficult to
prove that motive, for the employee will have to point to more than his own
conduct to show an employer’s intent to discharge or to demote him for engaging
in what the employer (mistakenly) believes to have been different (and
protected) activities. We concede that, for that very reason, it may be more
complicated and costly for the employee to prove his case. But an employee
bringing suit will ordinarily shoulder that more complicated burden voluntarily
in order to recover the damages he seeks.
Finally, the Court noted that its assumptions about the
actual facts of the case could be mistaken and should be evaluated by the trial
court:
There is some evidence in the record, however, suggesting
that [the plaintiff’s] employers may have dismissed him pursuant to a different
and neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any
political campaign. . . . . Whether that
policy existed, whether [his] supervisors were indeed following it, and whether
it complies with constitutional standards, see Civil Service Comm’n,
413 U. S., at 564, are all matters for the lower courts to decide in the first
instance.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
