Yesterday, a divided Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
on FMLA interference and retaliation claims where the plaintiff employee, like
55 employees before him, had been fired under the common company policy for
failing to call off for three consecutive days, but on the same facts the Court
reversed dismissal of his ERISA interference and retaliation claims on the
grounds that the employer’s failure to call him to check on him (like some
other employees who had similarly failed to show or call off) prior to
terminating his employment could constitute evidence of pretext. Stein v.
Atlas Industries, Inc., No. 17-3737
(6th Cir. 4-9-18). The Court
found that the employee could not show unlawful interference with his right to
take FMLA leave because the FMLA regulations permit employers to enforce
call-off policies, which the plaintiff admittedly had failed to observe due to his
own confusion about when he had been released to return to work. His confusion about what his physician had
written did not excuse his failure. The
Court also concluded that he could not show unlawful retaliation based only on the passage of 10 weeks between
the start of his FMLA leave and his termination because temporal proximity alone is insufficient evidence when the
span of time is more than 8 weeks. Unlike his FMLA claim, however, the employee was able
to produce evidence that his self-insured employer was very concerned about the
medical bills incurred by his son.
Therefore, the passage of 7 months did not destroy his evidence of
causation because he was not relying on temporal proximity alone and it was known that his son would likely require another
hospitalization. This “extra” evidence
of employer motivation also apparently made relevant evidence of pretext that the Court had previously rejected as
evidence of pretext in his FMLA claims.
First, the Court rejected the FMLA interference claim. The Court found that the employee’s confusion
about his medical release and its ramifications did not constitute “unusual
circumstances” to excuse his failure to call off work under the employer’s
policy. The type of “unusual
circumstances” that would have justified him not complying with the policy
would be a malfunctioning voicemail or telephone system. While the Court was sympathetic that the
doctor told the employee one thing, but wrote something else, the Court also
found that the employee should have read the form which his physician gave
him. The Court also rejected the FMLA
interference claim because FMLA regulations require employees to comply with
their employer’s call off procedures even if they are entitled to be on FMLA
leave.
Here, [the employer’s] policy required employees on medical
leave to either return to work or call in once their doctor released them with
light-duty restrictions. And the
company’s employee handbook provided that “any associate who is absent three
(3) consecutive days without permission or without calling in [would] be
automatically discharged.” . . . So, when
[the plaintiff] failed to report for work or call in for three consecutive days
after his release, [the employer] was within its rights to terminate him.
It was irrelevant that the employee was legally entitled to
reject light duty work under the FMLA.
Had [the employee] contacted [the employer] to say that he
was using his remaining two weeks of FMLA leave and the company subsequently
fired him under the attendance policy, [he] would have a claim. But that is not what happened. [Its] policy required [him] either to return
to work or call in and report his intentions, and [he] did neither. So the light-duty regulations do not protect
him.
Second, the Court rejected the FMLA retaliation claim. The employee apparently admitted that his only
evidence of retaliation was the temporal proximity of the termination – 10 weeks
after he began FMLA leave. There were
apparently no stray or other remarks which would show that the employer was motivated to retaliate for his taking FMLA leave. However,
temporal proximity alone cannot constitute sufficient evidence of
causation when the lapse of time is greater than 8 weeks. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of
the FMLA claims.
Finally, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to consider whether the employee was fired in retaliation for, and to
prevent him from, using his ERISA benefits to obtain employer-covered medical
treatment for his son. The employer was
self-insured for medical coverage and had stop-loss coverage for extraordinary
claims. The company had apparently
spent $500K on his son’s care in the prior year (part of which was covered by
the stop-loss coverage) and had been publicly lamenting “skyrocketing” health
care costs in employee bulletins. The HR
Director was alleged to have complained about this to another employee and attributed the rising employee premiums to his son’s $1M in medical bills. While the employee’s supervisor made the
decision to terminate his employment, he did not act alone because the HR
Director and the VP of Operations also participated in the decision, decided to
not reconsider or excuse his confusion about his medical release, and were well
aware of the cost of his son’s medical expenses. Further, the passage of seven months between
his son’s hospitalization and the termination decision did not destroy the
temporal proximity inference because, as just discussed, the employee was not
relying on temporal proximity alone
(as he did in his FMLA claim). This was
particularly true when it was known and likely that his son would have to
return to the hospital again in the future.
The employer again explained that it had fired the employee
under its policy of automatically firing employees who fail to show up or call
off for three consecutive days and pointed out that it had similarly fired 55
other employees under this policy.
Thus it is [the employee’s] turn once more. [The employee] “need not show that the
employer’s sole purpose was to interfere with [his] entitlement to benefits” or
to retaliate, but instead that a reasonable jury could find that unlawful
considerations were a “motivating factor” in its actions.
The Court then remarkably concluded that while the employer’s
rationale was justified under the FMLA, it could constitute pretext under
ERISA. Although the Court rejected the
employee’s argument that the employer’s failure to call him to schedule a
return-to-work drug test after he had been released to return to light duty was
evidence of pretext for his FMLA retaliation claim, it found that evidence
relevant for his ERISA retaliation claim.
Finally, it found that the employee’s “suggestion” that the employer had
called some workers to find out why they had not returned to work or called off
(instead of automatically terminating them) constituted evidence of selective enforcement and ERISA retaliation,
but was apparently irrelevant to his FMLA retaliation claim.
[The plaintiff] had worked at [the defendant company] for
nearly twenty years, had won at least one perfect attendance award, and had
worked overtime when asked. He seems to
have been a satisfactory employee. But
as the three days after his release to light duty rolled by, [the defendant
company] reached out only to [his] doctor and [its]third-party administrator
for workers’ compensation claims—just to double-check that [he] had really been
released. And even though [its] employee
handbook indicates that [he] had to “complete a return to work fitness exam and
drug screen prior to returning to work” that “[would] be scheduled by the Human
Resource department,” . . . the company
did not schedule [his] drug screen before it fired him. . . . Although [the defendant employer] was not
required to reach out to [him, for reasons set out in the FMLA-interference
discussion above, the fact that it did not do so could still raise a juror’s
suspicions about [its] motives. And
while [the employer] claims that this was all just standard practice—pointing
to a list of fifty-five employees that the company terminated under its
no-call, no-show policy in the past twenty or so years—[its] list only includes
names and dates. It does not indicate
whether these fifty-five terminations are otherwise similar to [the plaintiff’s]
in the relevant respects. And [the
plaintiff], for his part, has pointed to evidence suggesting that his superiors
selectively enforced the absenteeism policy by calling some employees to “ask
what’s up” when they failed to show up for work, but not others.
NOTICE: This
summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal
developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular
situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information
here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon
this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything
you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.