Last month, two Ohio Courts of Appeals affirmed the denial of unemployment compensation. In one, the Court agreed that the claimant had been fired without just cause on her part due to a physical impairment and failure of the employer to discuss or explore possible reasonable accommodations. However, she was denied compensation because she had improperly restricted her job search to work-from-home positions, thus making herself unavailable for suitable work, including from employers who might have accommodated her temporary impairment. Hines v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4066. In the second, claimant was fired for refusing the COVID vaccine on religious grounds and the hearing officer found her pro-life views – articulated for the first time in the hearing – were not sincere. Cyriaque v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4203.
According to the court's opinion, in the first case, the claimant had been working in her
clerical position from home for 14 months when the employer announced that it
wanted her to return to the office. She
did so for several months until she was diagnosed with a temporary medical
condition (which required surgery) and her physician provided a note requesting
that she work from home until a treatment plan was developed. She proceeded to work from home after
providing the note to her employer, but was fired for being absent after only
one day of working from home. The
employer apparently made no effort to discuss or explore accommodations with her. She applied for unemployment compensation,
but restricted her job search to remote positions because of her medical
restriction. The ODJFS found that she
had been terminated without just cause, but denied compensation because she was
not able and available for suitable work by restricting her job search to
remote positions.
During the hearing, the Claimant explained that she suffered
from a temporary condition that will be corrected by surgery. She was only applying for remote positions
and was physically capable of working full-time. After the denial of benefits was affirmed on
appeal, she finally retained an attorney to appeal the decision to court.
The Court explained that to be entitled to unemployment
compensation, the claimant must be both physically able and readily available
for suitable work:
R.C. 4141.29 governs an individual’s eligibility and qualifications for unemployment benefits due to involuntary employment. Relevant to the appeal, no individual is entitled to benefits for any week unless the individual “[i]s able to work and available for suitable work.” R.C. 4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i).
“One can be able to work but unavailable” . . . . By definition, the phrase “able to work” means “physical capability to work,” while “available for work” means “readiness to work.” . . . “To be available for work within the meaning of the statute, one must be ready, willing, and waiting to accept suitable employment, and must be exposed to the labor market.”
. . .
[Her] restriction that she only works from home due to her medical condition is too prohibitive and an undue barrier which prevents her from working in all forms of suitable employment. That barrier has not been lifted as [she] is still under the restriction that she works from home until she has surgery. Under the circumstances, this Hearing Officer finds [she] is not available for work and is ineligible for benefits [for] the period beginning September 18, 2022. [She] remains ineligible for benefits until she can show she is available for work without restriction and otherwise eligible for benefits . . .
The Claimant argued that the Commission had improperly
created a rule against limiting job searches to remote positions in violation of the statute “because it did not consider
the factors listed in R.C. 4141.29(F) in determining whether work-from-home
positions were the only suitable work for her based on her medical condition.” The Court disagreed:
R.C. 4141.29(F) provides in pertinent part:
[I]n determining whether any work is suitable for a claimant in the administration of this chapter, the director * * * shall consider the degree of risk to the claimant’s health, safety, and morals, the individual’s physical fitness for the work, the individual’s prior training and experience, the length of the individual’s unemployment, the distance of the available work from the individual’s residence, and the individual’s prospects for obtaining local work.
The Court found that “the section only requires the
Commission to consider these factors in deciding whether “work is suitable for
the claimant”; it does not require that the Commission affirmatively identify
the factors or make specific findings regarding these factors.” The Court also found that the hearing officer
had considered and asked the claimant questions relevant to these factors:
The hearing officer asked [her] about her medical condition and what limitations it placed on her ability to work. She testified that her condition did not prevent her from physically being able to work because she was still able to move and type and perform her duties. (Record at p. 82.) She also explained that nothing would interfere with her ability to work full time during normal business hours, nor would her condition render her physically incapacitated for any specific day or time. Id. at p. 82, 85. In fact, she stated that if her condition “flared-up,” it was a “quick fix.” Id. at p. 85. [She] also stated that she is “not restricted” in her capability, but “temporarily unable to go into a physical facility with the proper bathroom facility” for her — “I am able to work. I’m not restricted as far as that goes.”
The Court refused to re-weigh the facts of the case and
found the ODJFS had identified sufficient evidence to support its
decision: she “was obligated to be
available for all jobs that might be suitable opportunities, including office
jobs that could accommodate her considering her medical condition.” “The
fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for
the reversal of the [Commission’s] decision.”
Her physician’s statement only indicated a need for a
temporary accommodation, not a need to work from home indefinitely. “These statements do not support [her] belief
that she had to apply for only remote jobs; rather they support that [she]
would need an accommodation.” In limiting her job search to remote
positions, she had improperly limited her job search. The court agreed with similar prior decisions
that “a claimant cannot unilaterally determine what work is suitable or not
suitable, or self-impose limitations or conditions on suitable work when a
claimant conducts her job search.”
[Her] temporary medical condition that requires an accommodation is separate from her availability for suitable work. Granted, it seems futile to have a claimant search for all areas of suitable employment and then seek an accommodation once employment is offered. However, it is possible that some employers may not advertise the possibility of remote or hybrid employment. . . . Limiting a job search to only work-from-home employment would exclude those precise opportunities or employers who offer accommodations to those individuals who require them.
Finally, this court further finds that the Commission’s decision did not create “a blanket rule” that anyone seeking only work-from-home jobs is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Whether someone is available and seeking suitable work depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. . . . Accordingly, there can never be a bright-line test for when a person is determined to be “available” and what work will be deemed “suitable.” . . . Accordingly, this court’s decision is limited to the specific facts, circumstances, and procedural posture of this particular case. This decision does not foreclosure the possibility that a claimant would be eligible for unemployment benefits when the claimant seeks and requires only work-from-home positions when the facts and situation warrant.
According to the court's opinion, in the second case, the claimant was terminated after
refusing to be vaccinated on religious grounds (from Psalm 91). When she appealed the denial of unemployment
compensation, she and her pastor then articulated that the vaccines had been
developed using aborted fetus cells, in violation of their pro-life
beliefs. The hearing officer affirmed
the denial on the grounds that her religious objections were not sincere. The
claimant appealed.
Beliefs grounded in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause to the United States Constitution, which grants special protection to the exercise of religion. Because of this protection, unemployment benefits cannot be denied from a terminated employee when the termination – whether initiated by the employer or the employee – is the result of the employee’s sincere religious beliefs that prevent her from complying with a condition of employment. In such a circumstance, the termination violates the Free Exercise Clause and is without just cause.
Whether an employee’s belief is sincere is a factual
question. In this case, the Court observed
that the claimant and her pastor never mentioned their pro-life beliefs to the
employer before she was fired. She only
refused the vaccination on the grounds that she was a Christian:
[Her] exemption request form . . . did not include any reference to the use of cell lines obtained from aborted fetuses in the creation or testing of the Covid-19 vaccines. Likewise, neither of the two . . . documents executed by her pastor and submitted to her employer along with her request form set forth any specific reference to the use of fetal cell lines in relation to the vaccines. Indeed, it was not until after her exemption request was denied, and shortly before the telephone hearing, that her pastor wrote the . . . letter directly articulating the relationship between the vaccines and fetal cell lines and asserting that this relationship implicated the church’s opposition to abortion.
The hearing officer was entitled to assess the claimant’s credibility: “This contrast between [her] statement
provided to [her employer] and her hearing testimony provided support for the
hearing officer’s finding that [her] exemption request was not premised upon
her sincere religious opposition to the COVID-19 vaccines.” The Court found that the hearing officer was
not required to accept the sincerity of her beliefs simply because they were
unrebutted. “In other words, merely reciting a claim of a religious belief does
not establish the sincerity of that belief.”
The Court upheld the hearing officer’s exclusion of her pastor’s
testimony because her attorney conceded that the pastor would not say anything beyond
what was in the letter already admitted into evidence. Although invited to do so, the attorney did
not object and thus waived the objection.
It was not plain error to exclude testimony that would be duplicative of
other evidence.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.
