Monday, May 6, 2024

Ohio Court Upholds Termination of Disloyal Employee Against Public Policy and Pregnancy Discrimination Claims

Last month, the Highland County Court of Appeals affirmed the  Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal of a complaint filed against a bank for pregnancy discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  Storer v. Natl. Coop. Bank, 2024-Ohio-1676.  The Court concluded that there is no public policy in Ohio prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee who shared internal, private emails with her boyfriend’s attorney concerning a legal dispute with her employer.  While public policy may protect consulting with an attorney about the employee’s own legal problems, that policy does not extend to protect the employee from consulting with a third-party’s attorney about his problems.  Further, the Complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to show that her termination was related in any way to her pregnancy.  Simply making “speculative” and “conclusory” allegations that she was fired while pregnant cannot survive a motion to dismiss.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been a loan processor for seven years, had already been pregnant twice and always had good performance evaluations.   In 2021, her boyfriend had a dispute with the bank over procuring mortgage loan insurance.  She sent an email to the bank’s insurance analyst and later to the CEO and, apparently, shared them with her boyfriend’s attorney, who then produced them during litigation discovery.  In the meantime, she told her supervisor that she was pregnant with her third child.  There were no allegations that she or her supervisor told anyone else at the bank that she was pregnant.   Two months later, she was terminated for her “unethical” sharing of the internal emails with her boyfriend’s attorney.  There are no allegations that her supervisor participated in the termination decision.  She and her boyfriend then filed suit.  The bank moved to dismiss the complaint and its motion was granted.

As the trial court noted:

There is no case law to support a finding that the clear public policy of this state is to allow an employee to voluntarily provide information or assistance to the attorney of another person involved in a dispute with their employer. That could lead to significant adverse impact on businesses if employees were allowed to assist attorneys asserting claims against their employer. The Court finds that this is not a clear public policy of the State of Ohio and has no basis in the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the Court finds that Count One [wrongful termination] of the Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim under Ohio law upon which relief can be granted.

The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the public policy should be extended to her because she was “associated” with her boyfriend.   It found that she failed to allege such a theory in her complaint or to oppose the motion to dismiss at the trial court.  Further, the bank pointed out that the public policy exception for consulting with an attorney only clearly extends to disputes regarding employment rights and not to independent business interests of the employee which also implicate the employer’s rights or to lawsuits filed against the employer by the employee.

We find no legal authority to support an expansive public policy exception that would prohibit an employer from terminating an employee who assists a third party’s attorney on legal matters affecting the employer’s business.  . . . .  The concern identified by the trial court supports our decision not to extend Chapman: “That could lead to a significant adverse impact on businesses if employees were allowed to assist attorneys asserting claims against their employers.” And, analogous to the rationale in Taylor, forcing an employer to work with an employee who is assisting a third party’s attorney in a dispute against the employer would “place the employer in the unenviable position of having to continue in a relationship that has been tainted” by the dubious nature of an untrustworthy employee. Further, [the plaintiff] did not allege that she consulted an attorney to advise her of any rights she had as an employee.  . . .

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that she had sufficiently alleged that she was terminated because she was pregnant.  Her complaint alleged little more than that she was fired two months after informing only her immediate supervisor that she was pregnant.  There were no allegations that the supervisor participated in the termination decision or that she or anyone else had informed the decisionmakers that she was pregnant.

The Court observed that “although each element of a cause of action does not have to be alleged with exacting specificity, the complaint must still allege “sufficient underlying facts that relate to and support the alleged claim and may not simply state legal conclusions.”  In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged each element of a pregnancy discrimination claim in conclusory fashion without any underlying or supporting factual allegations.  Importantly, she “alleges no set facts to support her legal conclusion that the bank’s decision to terminate her “was motived by the fact she was pregnant.” It implicitly refused to impute her supervisor’s knowledge to the executive decisionmakers.

The Court also rejected her argument that the temporal proximity of two months between her announcement to her supervisor and her eventual termination by bank executives was sufficient to support a causal connection between the termination and her pregnancy without other compelling evidence.

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusion’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.