Last month, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a juvenile court must arbitrate the interpretation and application of the duration clauses in its collective bargaining agreements even though the court had argued that the evergreen clause rendered the entire agreement – including the arbitration clauses -- void and unenforceable. O’Malley v. Laborers’ Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local 860, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4192. The court argued that the agreements ended on the last day of the contract (December 31, 2019) and the union argued that the evergreen clause in the preamble meant that the agreements – and the arbitration clauses -- never expired until the conditions were satisfied (i.e., the union withdrew or the employees decertified the union, etc.). “[T]he expiration of the collective-bargaining agreements and the application of the evergreen clauses are issues of contract interpretation that can be arbitrated under the collective-bargaining agreements. We hold that the mutual agreement to arbitrate is sufficient consideration between the parties to enforce the arbitration clauses even while the juvenile court challenges the formation of the collective bargaining agreements as a whole.”
According to the Court’s opinion, the bargaining agreements
both provided that that they “shall remain in full force and effect until
December 31, 2019.” However, the evergreen clauses, which were included within
the preamble to the agreements, stated:
The Court and the Union recognize
that nothing in this Agreement supersedes or interferes with rights and
authorities granted to the Court pursuant to Ohio Revised Code (ORC) Chapters
2151 et seq. and 2153 et seq. Nothing in this Agreement abrogates the Court’s
rights pursuant to ORC Chapter 4117 et seq. Notwithstanding, the Court agrees
to recognize the Union and abide by the terms of this Agreement until such time
as a successor agreement is negotiated between the parties, the Union disclaims
interest, or the employees elect to decertify the Union as their exclusive
bargaining representative upon the expiration of this Agreement.
The agreements also contained a mandatory arbitration provision
in the grievance process. When the
parties were unable to reach terms on a successor bargaining agreement, the
court filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the
agreements had expired and were void and unenforceable as a matter of public
policy because of the evergreen clause and so informed the employees that the
agreement had expired. The union
responded by filing a grievance, requesting arbitration and responded to the
declaratory judgment motion. The trial
court ruled primarily in favor of the court, finding only that the agreement
did not actually expire until December 31, 2020 and that the remedy was for the
court to pay union dues between the time that it had cancelled the contract and
December 31. Both parties appealed. The
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that the matter was arbitrable and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
Although the court had argued that the entire bargaining
agreement was void, the matter was subject to arbitration because there were no
allegations that the arbitration clause itself had been secured by fraud. “The
two collective-bargaining agreements at issue in this case explicitly provide
that the parties are to arbitrate any interpretation and application disputes
arising from the agreements. The parties dispute the date the collective
bargaining agreements ended under the duration clauses and the interpretation
and application of the evergreen clauses, and those issues are arbitrable.”
The Ohio Arbitration Act provides
that an arbitration clause in “any written contract” is “valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” R.C. 2711.01(A). Like the Federal Arbitration Act,
the Ohio Arbitration Act affects the enforcement of arbitration agreements and
their initial validity. . . . For a party to challenge the arbitrability of
a contract under the Ohio Arbitration Act, the party must challenge the
arbitration clause itself. . . . . This
is “[b]ecause the arbitration clause is a separate entity”—i.e., it is a
contract within a contract—and so it “remains as the vehicle by which the
legitimacy of the remainder of the contract is decided.” Id. at 502. This is
known as the severability rule. . . .
. . .
The juvenile court is right that
the severability rule may not always apply. Indeed, some courts have found that
the severability rule does not apply when the parties challenge the existence
or formation of the contract that contains the arbitration provision. . . .
And the Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled that a dispute over an arbitration clause’s formation is
typically an issue to be decided by a court. . . . This is because “a court may order arbitration
of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties
agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” . .
Plainly, there may be circumstances
in which an arbitration clause cannot be severed from the contract, like in
disputes about whether the contract was ever signed or whether the signor
lacked capacity to assent, see Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 444, fn. 1,
but not all issues of contract formation concerning the underlying contract
will override the severability rule. . . . we cannot state that all issues of
contract formation override the severability rule and require a court to review
the formation of the contract before reviewing the application of an
arbitration provision within that contract.
What is clear from the caselaw on
these issues is that a court must determine whether a challenge to a contract’s
formation is also a challenge to the formation of its arbitration clause. And
here, the juvenile court’s challenge to the formation of the collective-bargaining
agreements is not a challenge to the formation of the arbitration clauses.
It is indisputable that the
juvenile court intended to enter into collective-bargaining agreements with
Local 860, as shown by the signatures on the agreements. Within each of those
agreements, the parties included an arbitration clause, and no party disputes
the existence of those clauses. It is well settled that “a mutual promise to
arbitrate constitutes sufficient consideration to form an enforceable
arbitration provision only where it is binding on both parties,” . . . . because
“the promise of one serves as consideration for the promise of the other, . . .
The juvenile court’s assertion that
a particular interpretation and application of the evergreen clauses renders
the collective-bargaining agreements without consideration and void ab initio
does not affect the arbitration clauses within the intended collective-bargaining
agreements, nor does it undercut the sufficient consideration between the
parties necessary to enforce the arbitration clauses as separate contracts.
Therefore, we hold that the arbitration clauses in this case are enforceable,
even when the overall consideration of the collective bargaining agreements is
being challenged.
. ..
As we have noted, when an
arbitration provision is in a contract, that provision applies to any issues
that the parties agreed to arbitrate. .
. . A court may deny a motion to compel
arbitration “only if the arbitration clause cannot reasonably be read to cover
the dispute in question.” . . . Here, the arbitration clauses cover the
disputes in question and the trial court therefore erred in failing to order
the parties to proceed to arbitration.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.