Franklin County Court of Appeals Affirms Removal of Civil Service Employee Because of Misuse of Employer’s Laptop Computer.

Last month, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed the removal (i.e., termination) of a civil service employee on account of, among other things, failing to sufficiently protect sensitive information on his laptop computer, and failing to cooperate truthfully with the internal investigation. Long v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2009-Ohio-643. However, the SPBR agreed that the employee had not violated policy by downloading AOL software in order to access his personal email or abused his telephone privileges by making personal telephone calls.

According to the court’s opinion, the employee was an audit manager and was issued a desktop and laptop computer in order to perform his duties. His “position and job responsibilities exposed him to sensitive client-based information related to Medicaid services, including Medicaid recipients' names and Social Security numbers, as well as dates and types of services provided. This information could be accessed via [his] desktop and laptap computers. All employees, including [him], were required to abide by [the employer’s] written work policies, including, as pertinent here, the ‘Standards of Employee Conduct,’ the ‘Computer and Information Systems Usage Policy,’ and the ‘Telephone Usage Policy.’” After the Ohio Inspector General received a complaint that the employee was engaged in fraud, an internal investigation was conducted. When questioned, the employee admitted “that he often permitted his staff to borrow his laptop computer while conducting field audits; however, he did not keep a written record showing to whom he loaned it. At the time of the interview, he was unsure if he had the laptop or if he had loaned it to a staff member.”

In examining the employee’s laptop, it was discovered that he had downloaded personal software onto the computer in order to access his personal email account and that pornography had been viewed. The employee also admitted that his cousin “used his laptop without his permission in early spring 2002; when he realized it was missing, he told [his cousin] to return it. He admitted that he had not properly secured the laptop, even though he suspected [his cousin] may have utilized his AOL account to send pornographic e-mails to women. [The employee] also acknowledged that he made personal long distance and local calls from his office telephone and failed to reimburse the state for those calls.” The cousin corroborated this explanation, although he contended that he sometimes had permission and did not know that the laptop computer was not the employee’s personal property. In reviewing the employee’s desktop computer, it was discovered that “e-mails with attachments containing pornographic photographs had been sent to and opened from the desktop and that at least one pornographic website had been accessed.”

The employer’s “standards of employee conduct and computer usage policies prohibited the downloading or viewing of non-work-related material, including pornographic websites, on state-issued computers.” The employee also argued that “unauthorized downloading of AOL software onto his laptop computer violated [the employer’s] computer usage policy. . . . . [which] prohibited use of computers by persons not employed by [the employer] and mandated that employees secure their computers to prohibit access by nonemployees.” In addition, the employer argued that the employee’s “personal local and long distance telephone calls from his office phone violated [the employer’s] telephone usage policy.”

The Administrative Law Judge did not agree that the employee violated the employer’s policy by downloading AOL software, accessing his personal email or making personal telephone calls. However, the ALJ agreed that the employee should be removed from his state civil service job because, among other things, he violated the employer’s policies in being evasive and providing implausible explanations during the employer’s internal investigation, in permitting and/or causing pornographic websites and other non-work related documents to be accessed on his laptop and desktop computer, in failing to take necessary precautions to prevent his laptop from being used by non-government employees when the laptop contained sensitive client information and was misused by his cousin in accessing and sending pornography, and in violating R.C. 124.34, as he engaged in dishonest and immoral conduct and neglected his duty by engaging in questionable financial dealings, being dishonest during the investigation, and engaging in the conduct described above.

The Court rejected the employee’s arguments that he was treated more harshly than similarly situated employees: “The issue of whether employees are similarly situated sufficiently to merit consideration as evidence of disparate treatment is for the trier of fact, i.e., the SPBR . . . Although the SPBR has discretion to consider evidence of disparate treatment in evaluating the appropriateness of discipline, the Ohio Administrative Code does not mandate absolute uniformity of discipline. 'An employee's discipline must stand or fall on its own merits.' " In any event, one of the allegedly comparable employees was not similarly situated because he was a non-supervisory bargaining unit employee who reported to a different supervisor, and not an exempt manager of ten people. In addition, that employee committed different rule infractions. The only other arguably comparable employee engaged in very different conduct by sending a single email falsely complaining about a subordinate.

Insomniacs can read the full court opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2009/2009-ohio-643.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.

EEOC: Store Pays $60K and Agrees to 5-Year Consent Decree After Laying Off Black Manager in RIF and Later Hiring White Managers.

Yesterday, the EEOC announced that Shopper’s Vineyard, a wine and liquor store in Clifton, New Jersey, agreed to consent decree to resolve a race discrimination lawsuit initiated on behalf of an African-American store manager who had been laid off in 2006. Pursuant to the five-year consent decree, the store will pay $60,000 and institute new anti-discrimination policies and procedures, including appointing an equal employment opportunity coordinator to insure compliance with Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, training managers regarding Title VII requirements on a regular basis, posting a notice to employees at the store about the decree, providing reports to the EEOC, and permitting the EEOC to monitor its compliance with the decree.

In its lawsuit, the EEOC alleged that the manager “was the only African American front-line manager at the Clifton store. Shopper’s Vineyard told [the manager] in 2006 that he was being laid off because of economic reasons, but [he] was actually laid off because of his race. Shopper’s Vineyard retained white managers with less tenure and experience and hired many new employees, including four new white managers, within the year after [the manager] was laid off.”

Insomniacs may read the full press release at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-4-09a.html.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.

IRS Explains Employers’ 2009 Payroll Tax Credit for Subsidizing COBRA Premiums for Terminated Employees.

On February 26, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service released information about how employers may claim credits against their quarterly payroll tax payments in order to subsidize continued medical insurance of terminated employees under COBRA pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. According to the IRS, “Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, will also be sent to about 2 million employers in mid-March. The form is used to claim the new COBRA premium assistance payments credit, beginning with the first quarter of 2009.” The revised instructions for Form 941 will “explain how to complete lines 12a and 12b, which address the COBRA premium assistance payments.”

The IRS also announced that “[e]mployers must maintain supporting documentation for the credit claimed. This includes:
• Documentation of receipt of the employee’s 35 percent share of the premium.
• In the case of insured plans: A copy of invoice or other supporting statement from the insurance carrier and proof of timely payment of the full premium to the insurance carrier.
• Declaration of the former employee’s involuntary termination.”

Additional information is available from the IRS at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=204505,00.html, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=204709,00.html, and http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=204708,00.html.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.

Franklin County Court of Appeals Denies Unemployment Compensation to Non-Profit Employee for Failing to Properly Supervise Client While on Cell Phone.

Last week, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of unemployment compensation to the former employee of a non-profit organization after the employee disregarded the employer’s interests by taking a personal cell phone call while on duty and while a client youth sitting next to the employee then injected himself with an epipen. Brooks v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2009-Ohio-817. The court rejected the employee’s arguments that other employees engaged in similar misconduct without being disciplined or terminated, that he had not violated any established policy and that he was treated more harshly than the new employee who was responsible for the epipen being unsecured.

According to the court’s decision, the employee had taken a number of youth clients to a camp when one of the youths returned to the van and sat in the front passenger seat. The employee joined him, chatted a while and then took a brief personal cell phone call. Another, new employee was responsible for the epipen being left out on the front seat console. The youth apparently opened the epipen and injected himself, requiring a trip to the hospital. Only the employee was fired. The ODJFS initially granted his application for benefits, but the hearing referee and, on appeal, the trial court, denied benefits:

“While claimant testified that he was not formally trained by UMCH [the employer] on the use of an EpiPen, he admitted that he knew that an EpiPen contains a spring-loaded needle to quickly deliver a dose of medication to someone who goes into shock as a result of severe allergies. He admitted that he knew that an EpiPen had been left resting on a console within the youth's reach. He admitted that he knew that he was not permitted to take personal cell phone calls while on duty, yet still turned his head for approximately thirty seconds to speak on his personal cell phone while he was supervising this youth. He admitted that the youth opened the EpiPen and injected it into finger while claimant was talking on his personal cell phone.”

The employee had argued that the Referee’s “just cause determination is unreasonable because the employer did not have a rule or policy prohibiting staff members from accepting or initiating personal calls while supervising youths.” However, the Court noted that the employee’s “own testimony belies his assertion, as he acknowledged that the employer had such a policy and that he knowingly violated it. Moreover, Ms. Roper testified that the employer ‘[has] a policy that the staff should not actively be supervising the kids while they're on their personal cell phone.’ Furthermore, ‘the critical issue is not whether the employee has technically violated some company policy or rule, but whether the employee by his actions [or inactions] demonstrated an unreasonable disregard for his employer's interests.' Here, the employer's best interests were served by appellant performing his duty to adequately supervise the youths in his charge and shield them from danger.” The employee “admitted that he was aware that an EpiPen containing potent and potentially harmful medication lay within reach of the youth; nonetheless, he did not confiscate the EpiPen and averted his attention from the youth to answer a personal telephone call. Appellant's actions and inactions potentially subjected the employer to liability had the youth suffered serious injury stemming from the injection of the medication. Thus, the [Referee] reasonably could view appellant's actions and inactions as detrimental to the employer's interests.”

The Court also rejected the claimant’s arguments that he was treated more harshly than the new employee who was responsible for the medications in the van and who was given only a written warning instead of being terminated. However, the Court agreed with the employer that he was treated differently because he had not received as much training as the claimaint and was not present to directly supervise the client youth at the time of the incident. As the most senior employee, the claimant also could have directed the newer employee to remove the epipen from the console, but he did not.

Finally, the court rejected the claimant’s testimony that other employees who had injured or placed client youths in danger were treated less harshly because he offered no evidence to support the other incidents aside from his own testimony.

Insomniacs may read the full court decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2009/2009-ohio-817.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.

Supreme Court: State Need Only Rational Basis for Refusing to Subsidize Union Political Speech Through Payroll Deductions.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld an Idaho state law which precluded payroll deductions by state and local governments to support political speech and political activities by unions. (Payroll deductions for regular union wages were permitted). The unions sued, arguing that the prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court noted that the state law did not prohibit the unions from engaging in political activities or speech; it merely refused to promote those activities through payroll deductions. Therefore, only a rational basis analysis applied; not strict scrutiny. Idaho's interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics was sufficiently rationale to support the legislative ban. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, No. 07-869.

As described by the Court, “[u]nder Idaho law, a public employee may elect to have a portion of his wages deducted by his employer and remitted to his union to pay union dues. He may not, however, choose to have an amount deducted and remitted to the union's political action committee, because Idaho law prohibits payroll deductions for political activities. In particular, “ Idaho's Right to Work Act declares that the ‘right to work shall not be infringed or restricted in any way based on membership in, affiliation with, or financial support of a labor organization or on refusal to join, affiliate with, or financially or otherwise support a labor organization.’ . . . “The First Amendment prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech"; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression. Idaho's law does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that speech by allowing public employee checkoffs for political activities. Such a decision is reasonable in light of the State's interest in avoiding the appearance that carrying out the public's business is tainted by partisan political activity. That interest extends to government at the local as well as state level, and nothing in the First Amendment prevents a State from determining that its political subdivisions may not provide payroll deductions for political activities.”

“Restrictions on speech based on its content are ‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny . . . The First Amendment, however, protects the right to be free from government abridgment of speech. While in some contexts the government must accommodate expression, it is not required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, including political ones. ‘[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.’. . . Given that the State has not infringed the unions' First Amendment rights, the State need only demonstrate a rational basis to justify the ban on political payroll deductions. The prohibition is not ‘aim[ed] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’ but is instead justified by the State's interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics. We have previously recognized such a purpose in upholding limitations on public employee political activities.”

“The question remains whether the ban is valid at the local level. The unions abandoned their challenge to the restriction at the state level, but contend that strict scrutiny is still warranted when the ban is applied to local government employers. In that context, the unions argue, the State is no longer declining to facilitate speech through its own payroll system, but is obstructing speech in the local governments' payroll systems. We find that distinction unpersuasive, and hold that the same deferential review applies whether the prohibition on payroll deductions for political speech is directed at state or local governmental entities. ‘Political subdivisions of States--counties, cities, or whatever--never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities.’ They are instead ‘subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.’ State political subdivisions are ‘merely ... department[s] of the State, and the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. Here, the Idaho Legislature has elected to withhold from all public employers the power to provide payroll deductions for political activities.”

“The State's legislative action is of course subject to First Amendment and other constitutional scrutiny whether that action is applicable at the state level, the local level, both, or some subpart of either. But we are aware of no case suggesting that a different analysis applies under the First Amendment depending on the level of government affected, and the unions have cited none. The ban on political payroll deductions furthers Idaho's interest in separating the operation of government from partisan politics. That interest extends to all public employers at whatever level of government.”

Insomniacs can read the full opinion at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-869.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.