The relevant statutory language
provides:
“No [public] company . . . , or any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in
the terms and conditions of employment because of [whistleblowing or other
protected activity].” §1514A(a) (2006 ed.).
The defendant argued that the
statutory language including coverage to contractors and subcontractors was
meant only to apply to professional ax-wielders like George Clooney’s character
in Up in the Air. However, the Court’s majority saw no
indication that this issue is what motivated Congress to include coverage for
contractors and subcontractors. Rather,
it saw the concern as the retaliation against former accountants at Arthur
Anderson, Enron’s former accounting firm.
Moreover, other language in SOX refers to the respondent as the “employer,”
which would be the protected employee’s employer. In addition, the remedies provided by SOX
include reinstatement, which would be impossible for a contractor or
subcontractor to effectuate if the statute only covered employees of the public
company customer.
The defendant further argued
that the statutory language was not meant to cover employees of non-public
companies because otherwise it would apply to employees of company officers and
employees, such as gardeners and nannies.
While the Court agreed this was a logical argument, it nonetheless
dismissed it:
Nothing suggests Congress’ attention was drawn to the
curiosity its drafting produced. The issue, however, is likely more theoretical
than real. Few housekeepers or gardeners, we suspect, are likely to come upon
and comprehend evidence of their employer’s complicity in fraud.
The defendants also argued
that the statute’s subheadings indicated that it was only meant to protect the
employees of public companies.
This Court has placed less weight on captions. In Trainmen
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519 (1947), we explained
that where, as here, “the [statutory] text is complicated and prolific,
headings and titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most
general manner.” Id., at 528. The under-inclusiveness of the two
headings relied on by the Court of Appeals is apparent. The provision
indisputably extends protection to employees of companies that file reports
with the SEC pursuant to §15(d) of the 1934 Act, even when such companies are
not “publicly traded.” And the activity protected under§1514A is not limited to
“provid[ing] evidence of fraud”; it also includes reporting violations of SEC
rules or regulations. §1514A(a)(1). As in Trainmen, the headings here
are “but a short-hand reference to the general subject matter” of the
provision, “not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the
text.” 331 U. S., at 528. Section 1514A is attended by numerous indicators that
the statute’s prohibitions govern the relationship between a contractor and its
own employees; we do not read the headings to “undo or limit” those signals.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and
alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and
does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead
to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.